In the early 1980s, the collapse of many state companies built by Kwame Nkrumah’s regime, plunged Ghana’s economy into turmoil. Job losses, high cost of living exacerbated by the fire and droughts, scarcity of basic social and economic services, and rising public debt forced Ghana to embrace structural adjustment program under the IMF and World Bank. In the countryside were also fading rural livelihoods. Farm, and receive little or no returns at all, due to the droughts, or migrate to Accra or Kumasi and struggle to survive.
Many rural dwellers in Tarkwa, Nsuaem, Obuasi and its environs, Bibiani etc resorted to the then forbidden small scale gold mining as a means to survive the economic downturns. It offered quick money, status, and the possibility of transforming one’s life. They were doing it with rudimentary tools, with very little or less impact on the environment.
But it was illegal before, and under Rawlings’s regime to mine with those rudimentary tools. The state knew only large-scale mining companies in Prestea, Tarkwa, Dunkwa, Bibiani, Obuasi and Konongo [Gold Coast main Reef] which were all making loses except for the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, now AngloGold Ashanti Obuasi, etc. At the time, it was illegal to make money from small scale mining, because the state had no control, could not tax them, control mercury use, and also mitigate the environmental impact, and so the state sought to stop them. Rawlings’s regime deployed the military to clamp down on those who were doing the true “gather and sell”.
Did it work? Was the military able to stop illegal mining? NO, it didn’t. Small-scale mining was then legalized in 1989. The legalization came with the PMMC to control the benefit from small scale mining through buying of gold from small-scale miners at fair prices and reduce smuggling. But it failed. Many rural miners couldn’t meet the licensing requirements. PMMC’s official buying rates were lower than what smugglers paid.
The outcome was predictable. Miners went underground. Smuggling thrived. The PMMC struggled to attract gold. And the state lost both control and legitimacy.
Then came September 2006, under President Kuffuor. He launched Operation ‘Fight Against Illegal Mining or Operation Flush Out’. It was a nationwide military exercise to sweep illegal miners who were expanding to legal mining sites and causing destruction to the natural environment. Same tactics produces same results, and so galamsey didn’t stop.
Under late President Mills too, the military were used. By 2010, the price of gold had rose from US$445 in 2005 to US 1,225. It climbed quickly such that by September 2011, the price of gold had reached US 1,895. This was enough incentive for galamsey to thrive, and it marked the beginning of the introduction of heavy equipment, facilitated by Chinese nationals into small-scale mines. By 2012, Ghana had produced 4,313,190.00 ounces of gold, the highest ever in the history of the country. Out of this record production, small scale miners contributed some 34% (1,423,453 ounces) of the total gold produced. Also, total gold production by artisanal and small-scale miners had risen from 2.2% in 1989 when it was formalized to 34% of the national production in 2012.
Take note that, the high gold prices of gold on the world market coincided with worsening youth unemployment and rural poverty. As a result, Galamsey was no longer just the work of local diggers. It had become a full-fledged economy involving financiers, Chinese machine operators, and local chiefs, with the youth as the lifeline.
Soon, the visible effect of the machines introduced begun to show. In response, the state revived its familiar weapon: the military. On May 3rd 2011, a combined team of the military, police and National Security arrested some 15 persons suspected to be illegal miners at Esuaso, Bonsaso and Beposo and were handed over to the Police. It was part of efforts to stop environmental degradation and to protect the Ankobrah, Bonsa and Pra Rivers. During the operation, various types of equipment used for the mining were confiscated while others were destroyed at the sites.
Did the military stop galamsey? It was a no.
Then came version 1.0 of President Mahama in 2013. He established the Inter-Ministerial Task Force on Illegal Mining, supported by armed soldiers and police in response to the invasion of the Chinese, and the fast pace of the destruction of rivers and forest reserves. The taskforce was deployed to raid illegal sites, seize excavators, and arrest miners.
These operations were meant to send a message that the state had control. But they failed because troops were sent in for a few weeks, then withdrawn, allowing miners to return almost immediately. Some officers allegedly took bribes to protect certain sites or tip off operators. Again, there was no development plan or economic alternative after the raids. It was purely destruction and displacement. Finally, the real beneficiaries; financiers and gold traders were untouched, while only poor diggers were arrested.
Just like in the 1980s, force was used to address an economic crisis.
With agriculture offering meagre returns and few decent jobs available outside the cities, galamsey remained the only viable livelihood for thousands of rural youth. The military could drive them away, but not keep them away because nothing else paid as well. By 2016, the task forces had fizzled out. The excavators returned, the rivers became more brownish, and the miners grew wiser; learning to hide operations, move at night, and shift between regions. You can win a raid, but you can’t win a war against poverty.
When President Akufo-Addo declared a “war on galamsey,” many hoped it would finally turn the tide. The Operation Vanguard and later Operation Halt deployments gave the military sweeping powers. Many excavators were seized. Pumping and dredging machines were seized and destroyed. For a moment, some rivers cleared, and excavators vanished. But by 2024, galamsey had re-emerged more secretive, more coordinated, and even more destructive.
Why? Because the economic logic of galamsey remained untouched. Mining still paid more than any legal job available in rural Ghana. Communities still depended on it for rent, trade, and survival. Financiers still had the capital to restart operations after every raid. Miners learned from each deployment; where soldiers came from, how raids were timed, how long patrols lasted. They began working at night, or deep inside forest reserves. Each military operation became a lesson for the next wave of miners.
We are in 2025, under President Mahama 2.0. Ghana has launched new anti-galamsey initiatives the National Anti-Illegal Mining Operations Secretariat (NAIMOS) and the Blue Water Guards, alongside an EPA-led taskforce.
These are positive institutional additions, yet they all follow the same enforcement-first script. The focus remains on deploying personnel, seizing equipment, and using force to halt operations. The structural issues; lack of jobs, low rural incomes, and the lure of high gold returns, remain untouched. The new approach repeats the same mistake as before: addressing the symptoms, not the source.
Without parallel programs to provide economic alternatives and legal pathways to mining, these new initiatives risk becoming Operation Vanguard with new uniforms. The miners will pause, adapt, and resume, because nothing in their daily reality changes. Every time the state uses soldiers or task forces, it mistakes an economic system for a security threat. Galamsey is not just illegal mining; it is an entire underground economy sustained by the failure of formal systems to provide opportunity.
The financiers, traders, and foreign buyers who benefit from it are rarely punished. The youth in the pits are the visible face of a deeper structure that thrives on weak governance, poverty, and demand for quick profits. Until the state offers credible, well-paying alternatives; and cracks down on the financiers instead of the desperate, enforcement will continue to chase shadows.
The Way Forward: Replace Force with Futures
- Make alternatives profitable: Agriculture, agro-processing, and small manufacturing must pay competitive incomes to rival galamsey.
- Formalize small-scale mining: Simplify licensing, provide access to finance, and integrate miners into legal frameworks. Then police those licensed to do what’s right.
- Target the financiers, not just the diggers: Trace and freeze illegal profits through financial investigations and prosecutions.
- Plan for post-military recovery: Every deployment should have a clear transition — jobs, reclamation, and community development.
- Empower communities: Let local people share in mining revenues and co-manage natural resources.
The military can restore order, but only development can restore hope.
Until Ghana builds an economy that pays as well as its soil, galamsey will not die; it will simply wait for the soldiers to leave.